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TOWARD THE VIABILITY OF STATE-BASED
LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS WORKPLACE
CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES
Paul M. Secunda†
INTRODUCTION
Private-sector employers in the United States routinely hold
mandatory workplace meetings during union organization campaigns
to express anti-union views to their employees.1 Employees must
attend these meetings at pain of discharge and may not be able to
leave these meetings, ask questions, or espouse pro-union views.2
Indeed, these captive audience meetings are so effective that
American employers are increasingly using this technique to also
inform their employees about their political and religious views.3
Because unions are generally not guaranteed access to employer
property to share their pro-union message with employees,4 organized
labor rightly believes such meetings give employers the ability to
effectively intimidate and harass employees during union

† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. I would like to
thank Matt Finkin, Dennis Nolan, Cindy Estlund, Seth Harris, Craig Becker, Jeff Hirsch, and
Brent Hunsberger, for their helpful comments and insights on the ideas contained in this essay.
All errors or omissions, however, are mine alone. I would also like to extend my appreciation to
the Lamar Order of the University of Mississippi School of Law for providing funds to support
the research and writing of this essay.
1. One recent study found that 92% of four hundred-studied union campaigns included
workplace captive audience meetings. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of
Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing, U.S. TRADE DEFICIT REVIEW
COMMISSION
81
(2000),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=reports
(last
visited June 9, 2007).
2. See discussion infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
3. See Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic Speech Shouldn’t Get Employees Fired, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005 (documenting increased use of political captive audience workplace
meetings); see also discussion infra Part I.B.
4. See Lechmere Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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organizational campaigns.5 And even beyond the issue of relative
economic power in organizational campaigns, forcing employees to
attend meetings during work to hear their employer’s views is simply
wrong.6 It represents the worst type of misuse of employer economic
power and interferes with employees’ dignitary interests.7 It is
therefore not surprising at all that unions would very much like to see
such captive audience meetings prohibited.
So what is being done to address this inequitable state of affairs?
Although federal labor law in the United States does not address the
ability of employers to express their views to workers on political and
religious issues,8 the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)9 as permitting employers to
hold these captive audience meetings with their employees on labororiented issues.10 Although this has been the state of affairs in the
captive audience meeting context for some time,11 there has been a
5. See William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections:
Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 570-71 (1983) (concluding that
employers’ captive audience speeches have statistically significant effects on voting in union
certification elections).
6. As Professor Balkin has observed, “[f]ew audiences are more captive than the average
worker.” J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990).
7. Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen,
he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.”). See
also Maltby, supra note 3 (“But when [employers] use their economic power over people’s
livelihoods to control the political behavior of U.S. citizens, it threatens American democracy.”).
8. There are important First Amendment considerations concerning whether such
limitations on political and religious speech qualify as reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions, see, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech must be narrowly tailored to a “significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”); whether
employers should have less constitutional protections in the workplace captive audience context,
see, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government . . . to shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”); Rowan v. U.S. Post
Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (“In today’s complex society we are inescapably
captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual autonomy must
survive to permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail.”); and whether
such laws are content-discriminatory, see, e.g., Waremart Foods v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.3d 870, 875
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding California union access law content-discriminatory); but all of these
topics are beyond the scope of this essay. The focus here will be on labor-oriented captive
audience meetings and whether state law prohibiting such meetings is preempted by federal
labor law.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
10. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.REV.
1527, 1536-37 (2002) (“The [NLRA] not only protects employers’ right to express their
opposition to unionization; it also recognizes their right to compel employees to listen to them in
‘captive audience’ meetings, while excluding union representatives from the workplace
altogether.”); see also discussion infra Part I.A.
11. As discussed in more detail below, employer captive audience meetings were found
lawful by the National Labor Relations Board in Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578
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recent push by organized labor in the United States to prohibit
employers from holding captive audience meetings concerning laborrelated, political, or religious speech.12
Under Worker Freedom Act (WFA) legislation percolating
presently in a number of state legislatures,13 employers would not only
be prohibited from holding mandatory sessions during work to
express opinions on labor-related, political, and religious issues,14 but
would be liable for retaliating against workers who reported the
holding of such sessions.15 Although a couple of states are close to
passing WFA legislation,16 only modified-legislation in New Jersey,
not addressing labor-oriented captive audience meetings, has actually
been enacted.17 And although New Jersey’s prohibition on captive
audience meetings involving political and religious topics might pose
constitutional problems,18 the focus on this essay is whether an
unmodified version of Worker Freedom Act legislation would be
preempted by federal labor law.19
This essay answers this question in two ways. First, under current
labor preemption doctrine and Supreme Court precedent interpreting
rights of states to continue to regulate property and contract rights in
the labor relations context, courts should find that such state laws are
not preempted by the NLRA. Nevertheless, opponents will likely
argue that such state captive audience meeting legislation should be

(1948), and the Supreme Court approved this holding in N.L.R.B. v. Steelworkers (NuTone &
Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958). See discussion infra Part I.A.
12. AFL-CIO,
Fighting
for
Workers’
Rights,
http://aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues/
workersrights.cfm (last visited June 4, 2007) (“The Worker Freedom Act will give employees the
freedom to walk away from these indoctrination meetings—and would bar employers from firing
or disciplining workers who choose not to attend or who report unlawful, forced meetings.”).
13. For a discussion of specific state legislation, see discussion infra Part II.
14. WFA legislation does not speak specifically about union-oriented speech, but instead
defines “political matters” to include discussions on whether or not to join a labor organization.
See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Connecticut Substitute House Bill No. 7326, § 1(b) (Jan. Session 2007),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB-07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007);
Oregon House Bill 2893, http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measures/hb2800.dir/hb2893.intro.html
(last visited May 15, 2007).
16. As of June 2007, Connecticut and Oregon are closest to passing such legislation. See
infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
17. New Jersey enacted the New Jersey Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act
in 2006, N.J.S.A. §§ 34:19-9-34:19-14.
18. See supra note 8.
19. This is a crucial question given the vast scope of implied federal preemption under the
NLRA. See Estlund, supra note 10, at 1530-31 (“The broad implied federal preemption of state
and local laws affecting collective labor relations blocks democratically inspired reforms or
variations at the state and local level, as well as state common law innovation.”).
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found preempted under the Machinists line of cases.20 Under this
labor preemption doctrine, federal labor law preempts any state
regulation of activity that, although not directly regulated by the
NLRA, was intended by Congress “to be controlled by the free play
of economic forces” in a “zone free from all regulations, whether state
or federal.”21 Opponents of WFA legislation would argue that these
laws interfere too greatly with the free play of economic forces left
unregulated by the NLRA by placing the state’s thumb on the union’s
side of the scale. This would upset the delicate balance of economic
weapons that the labor law currently permits during union organizing
campaigns.22
There are, however, a number of well-known exceptions to the
Machinists doctrine in the area of state police powers and the
regulation of property rights. Under this line of cases, traditional
areas of state concern are within the states’ power to regulate and,
therefore, not within the scope of NLRA preemption.23 Either the
state can provide for minimum conditions in the workplace under its
police powers or place property restrictions on the bundle of property
rights that the state grants to its property owners—that is, the bundle
of property rights that private property owners possess would not
include the use of their property for labor, political, or religious
purposes. Under this conception, and consistent with Section 8(c) of
the NLRA,24 management can still inform employees of their views of
unionization, but may not force employees into mandatory meetings
to hear those views. In this manner, a court deciding a preemption
challenge to the Worker Freedom Act should find that the states have
the inherent power to pass such laws under principles of federalism.25
Nevertheless, given the current conservative political bent and
judicial philosophy of the federal judiciary, there is reason to believe
that Worker Freedom Act legislation may be found preempted

20. Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,
427 U.S. 132 (1976). Machinist preemption and labor preemption doctrine generally is discussed
in more detail infra Part III.
21. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
22. See, e.g., Waremart Foods, 337 N.L.R.B. 289, 289 (2001) (“The Respondent asserts that
the ability to exclude non-union representatives from its property is the kind of economic
weapon that Congress intended to be available to employers and thus is not subject to regulation
by the States.”), vacated on other grounds, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
23. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (finding that
under NLRA employer has “legal rights to the possession and protection of its property”).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Part I.A examines in detail the free speech protections of Section
8(c) of the NLRA.
25. Indeed, “the strength and breadth of implied labor law preemption seems out of step
with the powerful tide of recent federalism decisions.” Estlund, supra note 10, at 1574 n.211.
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because of a too-aggressive application of Machinist preemption
and/or a general unfamiliarity with labor law. Consequently, it is also
necessary to answer the initial question of whether WFA legislation
would be preempted by going back to first principles and asking
whether current labor preemption doctrine should be modified.
Following the pioneering work of Professor Michael Gottesman
in this area,26 this essay renews the call for a reconceptualization of
labor preemption doctrine by the Supreme Court.
Professor
Gottesman has cogently argued that rights protected by federal labor
laws come in two varieties—those where the entire field is occupied
by federal law (“conduct on a continuum”) and those areas where the
federal law just provides some restrictions (“conduct not on a
continuum”).27 Like access to property cases, workplace captive
audience meeting cases should fall into the latter category once the
minimum conditions of free speech under Section 8(c) are satisfied.
That is, once federal labor law is satisfied by permitting the free
exchange of ideas on unionization between employers and their
employees, the state should then be able to go beyond that floor and
provide additional protections to employees to be free from
mandatory indoctrination sessions by their employers. And this
conception should apply not only to labor-oriented speech, but to the
growing use of political and religious captive audience speech by
employers as well.
Such a fundamental reconceptualization of labor preemption law,
of course, will not happen overnight, and would require the Supreme
Court to reconsider the foundations of its labor preemption
jurisprudence. Although the Court as currently constituted is unlikely
to undertake this process, this essay seeks to plant the seeds for a
future time when this type of American labor law reform has a more
receptive audience on the Court.
This essay is divided into four sections. Section I examines the
current state of federal labor law in the labor-oriented captive
audience meeting context and finds there is virtually no constraint on
an employer’s ability to use this highly-effective and harassing
campaign tactic during union organizational campaigns. Section II
explores current state legislative responses sponsored by organized
labor and notes the increasing success of these state legislative
initiatives. Section III applies traditional labor preemption doctrine

26. Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating
Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990).
27. Id. at 357-59.
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and concludes that courts should find such state-based responses to
worker captive audience meetings not preempted by the NLRA.
Recognizing that WFA legislation could still be found preempted,
Section IV renews Professor Gottesman’s call for a modified approach
to labor preemption doctrine in order to place WFA legislation on a
more solid doctrinal foundation.
I.

FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND WORKPLACE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE
MEETINGS

The lack of state action in private-sector workplace captive
audience meetings means that workers generally do not have federal
constitutional rights to free speech in the workplace.28 Instead, much
of the legal analysis concerning private-sector workplace captive
audience meetings in the United States takes place under federal and
state statutory law.
Even in the public sector, where First
Amendment rights sometimes do exist, there has never been any right
found to be free from captive audience speech by employers in the
workplace.29 Consequently, workers have historically looked to the
federal labor laws when seeking protection from forced attendance at
anti-union employer speeches.
A. The Use of Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in Union
Campaigns
Under these federal labor laws, however, workers in the United
States remain remarkably unprotected from workplace captive
audience speech by their employers. Such captive audience speech
occurs when employers require either supervisors to discuss antiunion opinions with their subordinates or when employers require
employees to listen to the employer’s anti-union message at
28. See Otis B. Grant, Law and Perceptions: Internal Investigations and Employee Privacy
Interest in Public Sector Employment, 71 UMKC L.REV. 1, 5 (2002). Somewhat related, some
commentators have argued that sexually harassed employees should be considered captive
audiences in the workplace and harassers should receive no First Amendment protection for
their speech. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 6, at 424 (“[W]e might do well to shift the paradigmatic
case of the captive audience from the passengers on the public bus or the child running through
stations on the radio dial to the employee working for low wages in a tight job market who is
sexually harassed by her employer or co-worker.”). This theory, however, has not been adopted
by many courts and the Supreme Court has never extended the constitutional captive audience
speech doctrine into the workplace.
29. But see Hamilton County Welfare Dept., 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 3036, n.5 (May
12, 1986) (“There are conceivable constitutional arguments against public sector captive
audiences which do not apply to private sector employers. At least it is arguable that a public
sector employer’s compelled audience meets the state action element requisite to a claim of
violation of the 14th Amendment.”).
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mandatory meetings during work time. Although in a formal sense
employees are free to walk away from such speech or not attend such
meetings, in reality, employees risk being fired if they are considered
to be insubordinate to their supervisors by failing to listen them or by
not attending anti-union assemblies.30 Indeed, employees can be
lawfully terminated for merely asking questions of their employers
during such a meeting31 or for leaving such meetings without
permission.32 One former member of the NLRB characterized this
power of employers to monopolize its workplace for anti-union
speeches as “one of the most potent and effective methods by which
self-organization of employees [can] be stifled.”33
It is therefore hardly surprising that the vast majority of
employers faced with a union organizing campaign make anti-union
presentations to their workers during mandatory meetings. For
instance, a federal government report studied four hundred union
elections and found that 92% of these union campaigns involved
employers forcing employees to attend captive audience meetings.34

30. The complete power that employers exercise over employees in the workplace and
subsequent impact that captive audience speech has on employees is well captured in the THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 125 (1938):
In considering the effect of the employer’s conduct upon the self-organization of
employees, there must be borne in mind the control wielded by the employer over
his employees—a control which results from the employees’ complete dependence
upon their jobs, generally their only means of livelihood and economic existence.
As the natural result of the employer’s economic power, employees are alertly
responsive to the slightest suggestion of the employer. Activities, innocuous and
without significance, as between two individuals economically independent of each
other or of equal economic strength, assume enormous significance and heighten to
proportions of coercion when engaged in by the employer in his relationships with
his employees . . . .
The Supreme Court has also recognized the practical realities of the workplace environment for
workers: “Thus, an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to
associate freely . . . [a]nd any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic
dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former,
because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more
readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.” N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969).
31. N.L.R.B. v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 11 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Hicks
Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1967) (upholding employer right to eject vocal pro-union
workers who speak out once captive audience meetings has begun).
32. Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968); see also F.W. Woolworth Co., 251
N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980) (permitting employer to exclude pro-union employees from captive
audience meetings).
33. Livingston Shirt Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 411 (1953) (Member Murdoch, dissenting).
More recently, another Board Member, former Chairman Gould, has stated: “[T]he captive
audience technique. . . has proved to be an extremely devastating technique in organizational
campaigns.” William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of
Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461,
484 (2007).
34. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 1, at 81.
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The average union campaign had eleven captive audience meetings.35
Additionally, 78% of the employers studied instructed supervisors to
give anti-union messages to their subordinates.36
B.

The Legal Status of Workplace Captive Audience Meetings Under
Federal Law

Although American labor law has remained largely fixed in the
captive audience area for some fifty years now, there was a previous
period of time when workers could seek varying degrees of protection
from such workplace speech under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act).37 When enacted in 1935 as the Wagner Act,38 the
NLRA had no provisions specifically addressing the intersection
between employee organizational rights and employer speech rights.39
Section 7 of the Wagner Act provided that workers had the right to
organize, to collectively bargain, and to engage in concerted activity
for mutual aid and protection.40 Employers were liable under Section
8(1) of the Act if they interfered, coerced, or restrained employees in
the exercise of any of these Section 7 rights.41
Given this language, the general thought was that employers
were supposed to remain neutral during union organizational
campaigns.42 When employers instead forced workers to attend
mandatory sessions to hear the employer’s anti-union views, the
National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board) initial reaction
was to say that this was employer activity that interfered with
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
38. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
39. Nevertheless, as early as 1939, the Supreme Court had made clear that employers
retained significant property rights even in the face of protected Section 7 activity by employees.
See N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (finding that under
NLRA employer has “legal rights to the possession and protection of its property.”).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.”).
41. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). Although under the Wagner Act the interference provisions were
initially codified as Section 8(1) and the discrimination provisions as Section 8(3), the TaftHartley Amendments in 1947 recodified these employer unfair labor practice sections as
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), and added union unfair labor practices under Section 8(b).
42. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 366 (1995) (“[T]he N.L.R.B. took the position
in its early years—in fact, in its very first case—that the employer should remain neutral during
union organizing drives because of its economic power and control over the workplace.”). For a
view that employers should still have no role in representational campaigns, see generally Craig
Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law,
77 MINN. L.REV. 495, 500 (1993).
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employees’ rights to organize under Section 7. More formally, the
Board established a per se rule against all workplace captive audience
meetings in Clark Brothers Co., Inc.43 In support of this rule, the
Board observed that:
[It] has long recognized that “the rights guaranteed to employees
by the Act include the full freedom to receive aid, advice, and
information from others, concerning those rights and their
enjoyment.” Such freedom is meaningless, however, unless the
employees are also free to determine whether or not to receive
such aid, advice, and information. To force employees to receive
such aid, advice, and information impairs that freedom; it is
calculated to, and does, interfere with the selection of a
representative of the employees’ choice. And this is so, wholly
apart from the fact that the speech itself may be privileged under
the Constitution.44

With regard to the potential constitutional issues caused by the rule’s
restraint on employer speech in the workplace, the Board commented:
“[The captive audience] was not an inseparable part of the speech, any
more than might be the act of a speaker in holding physically the
person whom he addresses in order to assure his attention. The law
may and does prevent such a use of force without denying the right to
speak.”45 In other words, the Board felt it was only regulating
employer conduct, not employer speech. The Board also pointed out
that the employer had other alternative means for conveying its
message about the union to its employees, short of threatening to
terminate their employment if they did not attend the mandated
meeting.46
Any future debate over the merits of the Clark Brothers doctrine,
however, was superseded by the passage a year later of the TaftHartley Amendments of 1947.47 Taft-Hartley completely changed the
dynamics of the workplace captive audience debate in American labor
law.48 Significantly, Congress felt that the Wagner Act was tilted too
far in favor of union interests in that it only addressed employees’
right to organize and join a union, only set forth employer unfair labor
practices, and did not protect employers’ speech rights in opposition

43. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
44. Id. at 805 (emphasis in original and internal citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 167, 172-187. The Taft-Hartley Amendments were enacted over
the veto of President Truman.
48. Becker, supra note 42, at 558 (“Since the Taft-Hartley Act, . . . the Board has refused to
separate the compulsion to listen from the freedom to speak.”).
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to a union campaign.49 Not only did Taft-Hartley amend the NLRA
to emphasize that employees may refrain from any Section 7 activities
and to insert union unfair labor practices,50 but just as importantly it
added significant employer speech protections under a new provision,
Section 8(c).
Section 8(c) of the Act states:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.51

As a result of this new provision, employers were now permitted
broad free speech and expression rights in the workplace, as long they
did not coerce their employees through threats or promises.52 Not
surprisingly, given this robust language, the Board quickly abandoned
the per se rule against captive audience speech as inconsistent with the
new rights granted to employers under Section 8(c).53
The Truman Board, however, still sought to regulate the use of
captive audience speech in the workplace. Although the Board did
not seek to limit the employer’s non-coercive speech during captive
audience meetings, it did seek to level the playing field by permitting
unions on the employer’s premise to give presentations on the
advantages of unionization. Under the Bonwit-Teller doctrine,54 the
Board began in 1951 to require that employers who gave captive
audience speeches to provide “equal opportunity” for unions to
49. See Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16
RUTGERS L. J. 269, 274 (1985) (“[T]he claim of one-sidedness on the part of the Board
prompted Congress in 1947 to enact a law designed to equalize the relationship between
corporations and union, the Taft-Hartley Act.”).
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b).
51. Id. § 158(c). The Supreme Court has subsequently commented that section 8(c)
“merely implements the First Amendment.” N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969).
52. Whether employer speech is considered coercive is a somewhat involved issue and is
discussed in more detail in Gissel, 395 U.S. 575 (threats) and N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts, Inc.,
375 U.S. 405 (1964) (promises). Because this article assumes that the captive audience speech by
employers does not contain unlawful threats or promises, this line of cases is not discussed
further.
53. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948) (“[T]he language of Section 8 (c) of the
amended Act, and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. case
no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor practices in circumstances such as this record
discloses.”). Indeed, “the legislative history of Section 8(c) contains adverse comment upon the
Board’s decision in Clark Bros., that a captive audience is per se unlawful.” Bonwit-Teller, Inc.,
96 N.L.R.B. 608, 614 n.12 (1951). Because the literal language of Section 8(c) applies only to
unfair labor practice cases and not election cases, instances of employer captive audiences
meetings could still have been found to warrant a new election, but the Board never adopted this
view of Section 8(c).
54. Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), modified, 104 N.L.R.B. 497 (1953).

SECUNDAARTICLE29-2.DOC

2008]

1/24/2008 2:00:03 PM

UNITED STATES

219

present their side of the story to workers at the employer’s facility.55
The Board reasoned that an employer captive audience speech
coupled with a valid no-solicitation rule was tantamount to a
discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule and an unfair
labor practice under Sections 8(a)(1).56 Even apart from this
reasoning, the Board felt that unequal union access to employees in
the workplace interfered with the employees’ “right to hear both sides
of the story under circumstances which reasonably approximate
equality.”57 Finally, the doctrine was seen as compatible with the free
speech provisions of Section 8(c) because the rule did not limit what
the employer could say, but only required certain employer conduct in
permitting similar access to unions to the employer’s facility to make
its own pro-union speeches.
Nevertheless, when the composition of the Board became
majority Republican two years later,58 the new Eisenhower Board in
Livingston Shirt Corp.59 abandoned the Bonwit-Teller equal
opportunity doctrine. There, the Board concluded:
[I]n the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule
(prohibiting union access to company premises on other than
working time) or a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but
unlawful because of the character of the business), an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a preelection

55. Id. at 612 (“[A]n employer who chooses to use his premises to assemble his employees
and speak against a union may not deny that union’s reasonable request for the same
opportunity to present its case, where the circumstances are such that only by granting such
request will the employees have a reasonable opportunity to hear both sides.”).
56. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S.
793 (1945), employers could prohibit union solicitation and distribution by employees during
working time, but not during non-working times in non-working areas of the facility without
violating Section 8(a)(1). Id. at 803. The Bonwit-Teller Board felt it a discriminatory application
of the no-solicitation rule to permit employers to give speeches to it employees in violation of its
lawful no-solicitation rule, but not to give the same right to the union. Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. at 611.
57. 96 N.L.R.B. at 612.
58. Interestingly, this narrative of the history of the captive audience speech doctrine under
federal labor law suggests that the political affiliation of the Board Members played a large role
in how Board law developed in this area. Elsewhere, through empirical studies of other Board
standards, I have argued that the Board may be less political than most commentators believe.
See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not As Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct, Institutional
Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 51, 53-54 (2004).
Nevertheless, it does appear that in particular divisive areas of labor law, such as the captive
speech area, political affiliation of Board Members still plays a predictive role in how the Board
decides cases. See Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 711 (2006) (“The only claim made in this Article is that ideology
has been a persistent and, in many instances, a vote-predictive factor when the Board decides
certain legal issues.”).
59. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
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speech on company time and premises to his employees and denies
the union’s request for an opportunity to reply.60

In coming to this new conclusion, the Board refused to condition the
free speech guarantees of Section 8(c) on giving a union a right to
reply on the company’s premises.61 The Board also appeared to place
additional emphasis on the employer’s property interests to exclude
unwanted visitors from its facilities,62 finding that unions had equal
opportunity to engage in comparable captive audience speech at their
own union halls,63 and that, “one party [need not] be so strangely
openhearted as to underwrite the campaign of the other.”64 All of this
was the start of a trend of denying union access to employer property,
as by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1956 opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Babcock
& Wilcox,65 union organizers were not only being denied the
opportunity to respond to employer captive audience speech in the
workplace, but more generally from coming on to the employer’s
property to distribute union literature and solicit membership.66

60. Id. at 409.
61. Id. at 406 (“If the privilege of free speech is to be given real meaning, it cannot be
qualified by grafting upon it conditions which are tantamount to negation.”).
62. Id. (“We do not believe that unions will be unduly hindered in their right to carry on
organizational activities by our refusal to open up to them the employer’s premises for group
meetings, particularly since this is an area from which they have traditionally been excluded, and
there remains open to them all the customary means for communicating with employees.”); see
also id. (“The majority in Bonwit Teller did not cite, nor have we been able to find, any support
in the statutory language or legislative history for holding that the employer who exercises his
own admitted rights under the statute thereby incurs an affirmative obligation to donate his
premises and working time to the union for the purpose of propagandizing the employees.”).
63. But see id. at 418 (Member Murdock, dissenting) (“[T]he natural prominence of the
plant premises as an extremely effective forum for dissemination of employer antiunion views
had, long before the advent of Bonwit Teller, been recognized as a fact of industrial life. To be
short, this is true not because of any decision of this Board but simply because that is where the
employees work.”); id. at 423 (“In contrast to the means open to the organizing employees, the
employer speech on company time and property has the tremendous advantage of securing the
undivided attention of all employees—interested, passive, and antagonistic. A carefully planned,
extensive, and well-organized speech, under these circumstances, is hardly on a par with the
limited time, argument, and opportunity open to the union.”).
64. Id. (“[A]n employer’s premises are the natural forum for him just as the union hall is
the inviolable forum for the union to assemble and address employees.”). But see id. at 410-11
(Member Murdock, dissenting) (“I cannot believe that the majority’s action in holding that an
employer may lawfully monopolize the most effective forum for persuading employees is
consistent with the declared congressional policy which is not that of neutrality but of
‘encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.’”).
65. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
66. Id. at 113. The Court did allow nonemployee access to employer property to distribute
union literature and solicit employee where the union was unable to reach workers through
other available channels of communication, id. at 112, but this exception has been largely limited
to such unusual settings as remote lumber camps. See Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 70 N.L.R.B.
178 (1946), enforced, 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948). And although the Board’s union access rules
have been liberalized at times over the years, see, e.g.., Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988),
Babcock & Wilcox’s more stringent limitation on nonemployee union solicitation and
distribution on employer property was most recently expanded upon by the Supreme Court in
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The Supreme Court signaled its approval of the Livingston Shirt
decision in N.L.R.B. v. Steelworkers (NuTone & Avondale).67 In
NuTone & Avondale, the Court agreed that the employer, in most
cases, had no obligation to provide access to its property to the union
for speeches to employees.68 There, the Court stated that, “the TaftHartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter of
abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every
possible means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that
they are entitled to use a medium of communication simply because
the employer is using it.”69
Nonetheless, and somewhat consistent with Babcock & Wilcox,70
the Court did hold open the prospect that unions may gain access to
an employer’s premises to convey a pro-union message if there is a
showing by the union that they are “truly diminished” in their ability
to communicate with employees. The Court did not provide a hard
and fast rule for when such circumstances might exist, but instead left
such determinations to the industrial expertise of the Board in
individual cases.71 Not surprisingly, however, there have been few
cases over the years that have qualified for this limited exception.72
As a result, while employers may exempt themselves from their own
no-solicitation rules73 and regularly use captive audience speeches as
part of their anti-union campaign arsenal, unions and their supporters
remain largely without the opportunity to respond to such speeches
under similar circumstances and conditions.
Exceptions to this broad rule permitting employer captive
audience speech without the ability for union response comes today in
only three narrow situations: (1) where the employer or union wants

Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., which eliminated the necessity to balance employers’ property
interests against unions’/employees’ organizational rights. 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992).
67. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
68. Id. at 363 (“Certainly the employer is not obliged voluntarily and without any request to
offer the use of his facilities and the time of his employees for pro-union solicitation.”). The
Court further observed that by allowing such union solicitation on its premises it may be accused
on dominating or assisting a labor organization in violation of Section 8(a)(2). Id. (citing 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)).
69. Id. at 364.
70. Unlike Babcock & Wilcox, the Court in NuTone & Avondale does not appear to draw a
distinction between nonemployee and employee speech, a distinction which is fundamental in
the union solicitation and distribution context. See DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
LABOR LAW 84 (2d ed. 2005).
71. Id. at 363-64.
72. See, e.g., S&H Grossinger’s, 156 N.L.R.B. 233 (1965), enforced in part, 372 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1967) (finding NuTone and Avondale equal opportunity exception applied where many
employees were isolated in resort community).
73. See James Hotel Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 761 (1963) (holding that employer may disregard
own non-solicitation rule).
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to hold a captive audience speech within twenty-four hours of a union
election,74 (2) where the employer has combined coercive workplace
captive audience speech with an unlawful no-solicitation rule,75 and
(3) where “access” remedies for the union are appropriate in
extraordinary cases involving particularly egregious unfair labor
practices76 and “access is needed to offset harmful effects that have
been produced by that conduct.”77 Subsequent attempts to argue for
union access to employer’s premises to counter anti-union captive
audience speeches beyond these limited circumstances have fallen on
deaf ears at the Board over the years.78
Short of fuller-access rights to counteract captive audience
speech, the Board has thrown unions a bone in the form of so-called
Excelsior Underwear lists.79 These employer-provided lists furnish
74. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953); see also Bro-Tech Corp., 330 N.L.R.B.
37 (1999) (applying Peerless Plywood rule to use of sound trucks). The purpose of this rule was
to preserve the “laboratory conditions” of the election so that employees could exercise their
free choice in deciding whether to be presented by a union. See General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948) (“An election can serve its true purpose only if the surrounding
circumstances enable employees to register [a free and untrammeled] choice for or against a
bargaining representative.”).
75. Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964), enforced as modified, 339 F.2d 889
(6th Cir. 1965) (finding Section 8(a)(1) violation where employer combined a coercive captive
audience speech during work time with an unlawful non-solicitation rule that did not permit
union solicitation during employee non-working hours in non-working areas). But see May
Department Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.
1963) (refusing to enforce unfair labor practice finding where an employer gave a captive
audience speech and maintained a lawful no-solicitation policy because Board did not consider
other alternative methods the union had for communicating with employees).
76. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 379 F.2d 223, 227 (6th Cir. 1967)
(permitting as a remedy union being able to address employees on company premises in
response to employer captive audience speech). But see N.L.R.B. v. S & H Grossinger’s, 372
F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1967) (denying union equal time on company premises to address
employees during working time). Overall, a remedy which requires the company to pay
employees to listen to a union speech is considered “strong medicine” for flagrant employer
violations and is consequently rare. See N.L.R.B. v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir.
1965).
77. United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., 646 F.2d 616, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In
such cases, “[i]f union access is needed to dissipate those effects, access may be granted even
though the union has alternative means of communicating with employees.” Id.
78. See Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (finding employees have no
rights under NLRA to leave meetings which they are required by management to attend on
company time and property); General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966) (refusing to return
to Bonwit-Teller doctrine and set aside a union election where employer made anti-union
speeches to employees at non-mandatory meetings and union was denied access to facility to
address employees). In General Electric, the Board indicated that it wished to see if the use of
Excelsior Underwear list, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text, would alleviate some of
the union’s organizational concerns. Forty years later, the Board has not revisited whether it
makes sense to return to the Bonwit-Teller rule in light of the continuing hurdles unions face in
being able to organize employees even with the use of Excelsior Underwear lists. Former Board
Chairman Gould recently pointed out that the rationale of Livingston Shirt was left untouched
by the Clinton Board. Gould, supra note 33, at 484 n.111 (citing Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii,
Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting)).
79. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).

SECUNDAARTICLE29-2.DOC

2008]

1/24/2008 2:00:03 PM

UNITED STATES

223

unions that have filed a petition for a representation election the
names and addresses of all employees who are eligible to vote in that
election.80 Of course, it is hardly surprising that union organizers do
not find this method of counteracting captive audience speech nearly
as effective as being able to address employees directly on the
employer’s premises.81
More recently, however, unions have employed other techniques
to gain access to employees at targeted employers. For instance,
unions have been using email, blogs, and the internet to communicate
with workers. The efficacy of these methods of communicating with
workers is yet to be determined and there are still issues over whether
the employer must permit the union the use of its electronic
communications.82
Unions have also sought additional
communication between their organizers and employees by having
their organizers apply for jobs with the company they are seeking to
organize. Such “salting” practices have been upheld by the Supreme
Court, but again do not seem to effectively counteract the power of
the employer captive audience meeting.83
Indeed, empirical studies indicate that even alternative methods
for unions to communicate with workers are not nearly effective as
employer captive audience meeting.84 In short, unions are playing a

80. Id. at 1239-40 (“[W]ithin 7 days after the Regional Director has approved a consentelection agreement . . . or after the Regional Director or the Board has directed an election . . . ,
the employer must file with the Regional Director an election eligibility list, containing the
names and addresses of all the eligible voters. The Regional Director, in turn, shall make this
information available to all parties in the case.”). The Excelsior Underwear list is seen as helping
employees vindicate their organizational rights without raising the same property right issues in
cases like NuTone & Avondale and Lechmere.
81. One need only consider a scenario in which the employer is located in a heavilypopulated urban center and employees live spread out across the metropolitan area. The
resources it takes to travel to each employee home or to otherwise contact them is a substantial
hurdle to being effectively able to apprise them of arguments in favor of unionism.
Nevertheless, the Board has refused to adopt a “big city” access rule. See Monogram Models,
Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705 (1971).
82. On March 27, 2007, the Board took the unusual step of hearing oral argument on this
issue in the case of The Guard Publishing Company, d/b/a The Register-Guard. See Jeffrey M.
Hirsch, Register-Guard Oral Argument, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG, Mar. 27, 2007,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog
/2007/03/registarguard_o.html (last visited June 11, 2007). See also generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch,
The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEORGE WASHINGTON L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008); Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act
in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000).
83. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec. Co., 516 U.S. 85 (1995). The effectiveness of the
salting strategy has been recently compromised by the Second Bush Board’s holding that the
burden of proof falls on the salt to show the damage caused by an employer’s discriminatory
failure to hire or discharge. See Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (2007).
84. See generally JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY 90-92 (1976) (based on organizing campaigns study, finding that only about onethird of employees attended union-sponsored meetings held away from the employer’s
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constant game of catch-up. With this current state of affairs, the labor
movement has considered state statutory alternatives for protecting
employees from the impact of captive audience speech in the
workplace.85
C.

Political and Religious Expansion of American Workplace
Captive Audience Speech

In addition to the classic use of captive audience speech by
employers to defeat union campaigns, there is increasing evidence
that employers are also engaging in political and religious captive
audience speech in the workplace. During these sessions, employees
are forced, at the pain of losing their jobs, to listen to their employer’s
perspective on the latest political and religious issues of the day.
For instance, during the last presidential election, the National
Association of Manufacturers sought to have employers use their
workplaces to have meetings with their employees to discuss partisan
political issues.86 Employees were urged to act in their employer’s
best interest by not voting for unacceptable candidates.87 These
meetings were not voluntary and employees could lose their jobs by
not attending. As one commentator has observed, such political
captive audience speeches are highly effective because “[p]eople need
their jobs, and many will sacrifice their rights as citizens to continue to
provide for themselves and their families. Consequently, an employer
that tries to use its financial muscle to control employees’ political
behavior will often succeed.”88

workplace). But see discussion supra note 82-83 and accompanying text on newly-emerging
techniques for unions to communicate with workers.
85. Presently pending federal legislation may also reinvigorate union organizational rights.
On March 1, 2007, the House approved the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), H.R. 800, 110th
Cong. (2007). See Michael Newman & Shane Crase, The Future of Secret Ballot Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 54 FED. LAW. 14, 14 (2007). The EFCA would, among other
things, require unions to be recognized based on signed authorization cards. Id. By not having to
go through the formal union election process, the EFCA might go a long way in undermining the
importance of employer captive audience meetings. Similarly, neutrality agreements, under
which employer agree to remain neutral in a union organization campaign, would effectively
eliminate or modify the use of anti-union captive audience speech. See Cynthia Estlund,
Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace By Contract Again, 28 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 351, 357 (2007) (“A neutrality agreement aims to achieve by contract many of the
reforms that unions have failed to secure by statute, such as organizer access to the workplace
and restrictions on anti-union campaigns and ‘captive audience’ meetings.”). Given the current
political environment, it is unlikely, however, that the EFCA will be enacted any time soon.
Accord id. at 352-53.
86. Center for Policy Alternatives, Worker Freedom from Mandatory Meetings, available at
http://www.stateaction.org/issues/issue.cfm/issue/WorkerFreedom.xml (last visited June 9, 2007).
87. Id.
88. Maltby, supra note 3.
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In addition to political speeches, there is increasing evidence that
employers are also engaging in more religious proselytizing at work
during captive audience meetings.89
Evangelical Christian
organizations are offering Christian ministry services for employers to
provide to their employees during work hours.90 Prayer breakfasts,
faith-based training and education, and requests for information about
employees’ religious affiliations are becoming part of the American
workplace.91 One indication of the increasing prevalence of religion in
the American workplace is the growth of Marketplace Ministries, Inc.,
which now has 1700 chaplains who make on-site visits to 300
companies in 38 states.92 Although there are limits on the ability of
employers to proselytize in the workplace under Title VII and parallel
state anti-discrimination law,93 the relative lack of cases in this area
suggest that employees do not yet feel comfortable fighting back
against these workplace practices.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Center for Policy Alternatives, supra note 86.
Id.
Id.
Stephen Singer, Conn. Considers Bill to Prevent Proselytism in the Workplace, AP, Mar.
11,
2006,
available
at
http://www.christianpost.com/article/20060311/19361_Conn._Considers_Bill_to_Prevent
_Proselytism_in_the_Workplace.htm (last visited June 9, 2007). But the founder of the
Marketplace Ministries group insists: “We’re not there to proselytize . . . I don’t take my faith to
harass you or hurt you or make you feel inferior.” Id.; see also Neela Banerjee, At Bosses’
Invitation, Chaplains Comes Into Workplace and Onto Payroll, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A16,
available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.html?res=F30813FA345A0C778CDDAB0994DE404482 (last visited June 9, 2007)
(“From car parts makers to fast food chains to financial service companies, corporations across
the country are bringing chaplains into the workplace. At most companies, the chaplaincy
resembles the military model, which calls for chaplains to serve the religiously diverse
community before them, not to evangelize.”).
93. Title VII prohibits religious discrimination in the workplace, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a),
and also requires employers to accommodate the religious practices of employees to the extent
that it does not cause an undue burden to the employer. Id. at § 2000e(j); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). There is a good argument that employer-sponsored
religious proselytizing could rise to the level of unlawful religious harassment if it otherwise
satisfied the elements for a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. See Michael D.
Moberly, Bad News for Those Proclaiming the Good News: The Employer’s Ambiguous Duty to
Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 61 (2001) (applying NLRAbased approach to regulate workplace proselytizing); Josh Schopf, Religious Activity and
Proselytization in the Workplace: The Murky Line Between Healthy Expression and Unlawful
Harassment, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 55 (1997) (“If an employer or co-worker
attempts to impose his religious beliefs on others and does so in a constant and pervasive
manner sufficient to create hostility, those targeted should not be forced to endure the
imposition without being able to take legal measures to end such activity.”). But see Meltebeke
v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 903 P.2d 351, 363 (Or. 1995) (under Oregon anti-discrimination
law, holding that employer must know that that religious proselytizing created an intimidating,
hostile or offensive working environment). Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is of the long-held view that workplace proselytization can amount to
unlawful harassment in appropriate circumstances. See EEOC Dec. No. 72-1114, 4 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 842, 842 (Feb. 18, 1972).
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Consequently, organized labor has sought not only to protect
employees against labor-oriented captive audience meetings at work,
but also against political and religious intimidation and pressure. The
states are starting to respond to this need by considering Workplace
Freedom Act legislation.
II. THE RISING TIDE OF STATE WORKPLACE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE
LEGISLATION
Although employer captive audience speech remains largely
unregulated under the NLRA as discussed in the previous section,
there has been significant legislative movement on the state level in
the past few years to pass laws that would prohibit captive audience
meetings involving political, religious, or labor-oriented speeches.94
The same debates at the Board about employer ability to give such
workplace speeches from fifty years ago continue today between
business and labor lobbyists in this new battleground. Employers
believe that such laws would amount to a constitutional infringement
on their free speech rights to communicate with their workers and
would be inconsistent with existing federal labor law. Unions respond
that such legislation does not bar employers from holding such
meetings, only from mandating employee attendance, and employees
should not be forced to listen to speech they do not want to hear.95
Following the lead of the AFL-CIO,96 a number of states have
considered Worker Freedom Act (WFA) legislation.97 This legislation
94. One of the sponsors of one such captive audience bill introduced in Washington
explained the impetus behind outlawing captive audience meetings in the workplace this way:
“[Mandatory employment meetings are] one of the reasons we’ve seen such a decline in privatesector unionism. What we’re trying to do is restore some balance.” See Ralph Thomas, Labor
Lobbyists Push Union Bill; Quick Passage Sought - It Would Ban Companies from Requiring
Attendance at Organization Meetings, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at B2.
95. For examples of the views of proponents and opponents of such state legislation, see the
Nature and Sources of Support and Opposition in the Connecticut Judiciary Committee’s Joint
Favorable
Report
on
HB-7326
(Apr.
3,
2007),
available
at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/JFR/H/2007HB-07326-R00JUD-JFR.htm (last visited June 4, 2007).
96. Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act Goes Into Effect Immediately,
JACKSON
LEWIS
LEGAL
UPDATE,
Aug.
16,
2006,
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=979 (last visited May 15, 2007)
(stating that the newly enacted New Jersey Workplace Freedom law stems from the AFL-CIO’s
model Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act).
97. There are also so-called “State Financial Accountability Acts” which prohibit public or
private employers from using state funds “to assist, deter, or promote” union organizing. See,
e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 16645-16649 (forbidding California employers who receive state grants
or funds in excess of $10,000 from using such funding to “assist, promote, or deter union
organizing”). Such laws have been recently found not to be preempted by the NLRA by the en
banc Ninth Circuit in Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc),
petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2007) (No. 06-939), and the Second Circuit
in Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2006). Although such laws

SECUNDAARTICLE29-2.DOC

2008]

1/24/2008 2:00:03 PM

UNITED STATES

227

would “give employees the freedom to walk away from political or
religious indoctrination meetings—and would bar employers from
firing or disciplining workers who choose not to attend or who report
unlawful forced meetings.”98 Generally, it is clear in most of these
bills that speech on “political matters” includes speech on labor
organizing.99 None of these laws have yet to be enacted. States with
current Worker Freedom Act legislation with the best chance of being
enacted include Connecticut and Oregon.100
For instance, in Connecticut, the proposed captive audience bill,
the Freedom in the Workplace Act, would prohibit an employer from
requiring employees to attend an employer-sponsored meeting when
the primary purpose is to communicate the employer’s opinion about
religious or political matters.101 “Political matters” are further defined
to include the decision to join or not join a labor organization,102
though the legislation does not seek to impair rights under a collective

could also help in preventing employee captive audience meetings, their focus is both broader
and narrower than captive audience bills; broader in applying to many more labor activities, but
narrower in only applying to employers that receive state funds. They also concern legislation
that potentially prevents speech as opposed to just prohibiting attendance at mandatory
workplace meetings. Because these cases raise substantially different issues under preemption
analysis, these cases are not further focuses on in this essay.
98. AFL-CIO,
2007
State
Working
Families
Agenda,
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues
/upload/WFAgenda2007.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007). The AFL-CIO states that, “[a]t least 9
states are expected to consider legislation to protect workers’ freedom in 2007.” AFL-CIO,
Fighting
for
Worker’s
Rights,
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues/workersrights.cfm (last visited May 15,
2007).
99. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
100. As of early June 2007, the Oregon Worker Freedom Act has passed the Oregon House
and is awaiting action by the Senate. Oregon House Bill 2893, http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/
measures/hb2800.dir/hb2893.intro.html (last visited May 15, 2007); see also Brent Hunsberger,
Unions
Seek
New
Ally:
The
Law,
THE
OREGONIAN,
May
11,
2007,
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/oregonian/
index.ssf?/base/business/11788900037310.xml&coll=7 (last visited May 15, 2007). Similarly,
Connecticut Worker Freedom legislation is awaiting further action. Connecticut Substitute
House Bill No. 7326 (Jan. Session 2007), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007). Similar bills have recently failed in Colorado and
Washington. See Colorado General Assembly, Summarized History for Bill Number HB061314, http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS2006A/
csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/9A96E6C3FF2C2B13872570E00064ABEB?Open&file=1314_enr.pdf
(last
visited May 10, 2007); WSLC Legislative Update—March 16, 2007, Dead or Alive . . . Still
Wanted, http://www.wslc.
org/legis/07lu0316.htm (last visited May 10, 2007).
101. Connecticut Substitute House Bill No. 7326, § 1(b) (Jan. Session 2007), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB-07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007). Exceptions are
made for religious or political matters which the employer by law must discuss with its
employees, for political and religious employers, for higher education institutions engaged in
regular coursework, and for casual conversations between employer and employees in the
normal course of the employee’s duties. Id. § 1(b), (f).
102. Id. § 1(5).
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bargaining agreement.103 Moreover, employees who are disciplined
for making a good-faith report about an unlawful workplace captive
audience meeting are provided with a private whistle blower right of
action under which they may be entitled to treble damages and
attorney’s fees.104
As of early June 2007, the bill has been approved by the Labor
and Public Employees, Appropriations, and Judiciary Committees of
the Connecticut General Assembly and is awaiting further legislative
action.105 If it is enacted, it is scheduled to be effective on October 1,
2007.106 Nevertheless, the Connecticut Officer of Legislative Research
(OLR) has expressed concern that if legislation seeks to eliminate
labor-oriented captive audience meetings, such legislation might be
preempted by the NLRA.107 In this regard, the OLR concluded that,
“it appears likely that, based on the history of the NLRA and court
rulings, that the NLRA would preempt the bill’s provisions as they
relate to labor organizing.”108
Likely responding to these same preemption concerns, New
Jersey enacted a modified Worker Freedom Act in 2006, the New
Jersey Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act.109 This law
does not seek to regulate captive audience meetings related to labor
organizing as the Connecticut bill does. Instead, the New Jersey
legislation only makes it unlawful for any employer to force its
employees to attend employer-sponsored meetings whose purpose is
to discuss the employers’ opinions on religious and political matters.110

103. Id. § 1(e).
104. Id. § 1(d). Such an action must be brought within ninety days of the unlawful meeting.
Id.
105. See
Connecticut
General
Assembly,
H.B.
No.
7326
Bill
History,
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dtSearch_
lpa.html (last visited June 9, 2007) (must enter “bill status” and search for “7326”).
106. Connecticut Substitute House Bill No. 7326, § 1 (Jan. Session 2007), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB-07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007).
107. OLR Research Report, Captive Audience Prohibitions and Federal Preemption,
http://www.cga.ct.gov/
2006/rpt/2006-R-0204.htm (last visited May 15, 2007).
108. Id.
109. N.J.S.A. §§ 34:19-9-34:19-14.
110. Id. § 34:19-10 (“No employer or employer’s agent, representative or designee may,
except as provided in section 3 of this act, require its employees to attend an employersponsored meeting or participate in any communications with the employer or its agents or
representatives, the purpose of which is to communicate the employer’s opinion about religious
or political matters.”) (internal citation omitted). The New Jersey legislature went out of its way
to make clear that it was not seeking to regulate speech, but only conduct. Under the law,
employers can still converse with their employees in a voluntarily manner over such issues as
long as the “employer notifies the employees that they may refuse to attend the meetings or
accept the communications without penalty.” Id. § 34:19-10. Similar exceptions discussed with
regard to the Connecticut legislation also exist under the New Jersey law, see id. §§ 34:19-11(a), §
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In the New Jersey bill, however, “political matters,” does not include
meetings concerning the decision to join a labor organization.111
The absence of labor organizations from the New Jersey law was
not an oversight. Indeed, before being enacted, the legislature
amended the bill to remove the words “labor organization,” and a
definition for that phrase, from the bill.112 As a result, employers may
continue to hold mandatory captive audience meetings to express
their anti-union views during unionization drives.113 And although it is
still possible that the New Jersey law will be challenged on
constitutional grounds as impermissibly interfering with employer
speech,114 without the labor language it does not raise labor
preemption issues.
But what if Connecticut, Oregon, or another state passes a
version of the Worker Freedom Act that does preclude employers
from holding labor-oriented captive audience meetings? The next
section considers whether such legislation would be preempted by the
NLRA under current labor preemption doctrine.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL LABOR PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE
When discussing current labor preemption doctrine in the United
States, and the move to state-based legislative responses for what ills
American labor relations law, one cannot avoid a sense of irony.115
When Congress initially enacted the NLRA in 1935, state courts and
legislatures were very pro-employer, and the labor movement sought

34:19-11(b)(1)-(3), as well as similar remedial provisions for whistle blowers. See id. §§ 34:19-1234:19-14.
111. See id. § 34:19-9.
112. See Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act, As reported by the Senate
Labor
Committee
on
February
6,
2006,
with
amendments,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/legis/2006c53.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007).
113. “Significantly, while the Act stems from the AFL-CIO’s model Freedom from
Employer Intimidation Act, drafters of the New Jersey law eliminated the phrase ‘labor
organizations’ from the Act’s definition of ‘political matters.’ Consequently, employers may
continue to hold mandatory captive-audience speeches to communicate with employees their
position on unions without running afoul of the Act. ” Worker Freedom from Employer
Intimidation Act Goes Into Effect Immediately, JACKSON LEWIS LEGAL UPDATE, Aug. 16, 2006,
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=979 (last visited May 15, 2007).
114. The question of whether the New Jersey law’s prohibitions on employer captive
audience meetings for political and religious speech are constitutionally valid will be left for
another day as it is beyond the present scope of this essay. See supra note 8.
115. Gould, supra note 33, at 489 (“Ironically, the preemption doctrine was thought to
implement the principles of the statute more effectively inasmuch as repressive state regimes
were ousted from the jurisdiction over strikes, picketing and other forms of concerted activity.”).
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broad protections from the new federal labor laws.116 At the time,
federal labor law sought to proactively encourage unionization and
collective bargaining between employers and their employees.117
Starting with the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of
1947, however, the federal government’s orientations toward
unionization became decidedly neutral, with the emphasis of the new
amendment being on the employees’ ability to exercise free choice “in
laboratory conditions”118 to decide whether they wished to be
represented by a union.119 Even more recently, with the increased
politicization of the National Labor Relations Board, especially by the
second Bush administration,120 federal labor law has been interpreted
to favor employers of many issues considered essential to organized
labor. The surprising upshot of all this labor history is that there has
been an increasing push by the labor movement to decrease the scope
of labor preemption to permit state legislation to provide union
protections that federal labor law no longer does.121
A. A Brief Primer on American Labor Preemption Law
In its simplest form,122 labor preemption doctrine deals with the
conflicts that inevitably arise between federal labor law and state laws
and regulations. Based on the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
U.S. Constitution,123 where federal and state labor laws collide, the
state law in question must give way in favor of the federal scheme. In

116. Gottesman, supra note 26, 378 n. 90 (“The [NLRA] was enacted out of dissatisfaction
with state treatment of labor relations, and Section 7 stands as a declaration of ‘rights’
independently of the prohibitions on employer interference appearing in Section 8.”).
117. Estlund, supra note 10, at 1533.
118. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“In election proceedings, it is the
Board’s function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”).
119. Estlund, supra note 10, at 1534 (“Taft-Hartley turned away from the forthright
endorsement of collective bargaining and reframed the basic policy of the Act as favoring
employee ‘free choice’ with respect to unionization and collective bargaining.”).
120. For the view that the second Bush Board is one of the most politicized in Board’s
history, see Gould, supra note 33, at 470 (“The Bush II Board has pushed matters to one end of
the continuum. The tilt on the seesaw has become the topsy-turvy process of an upside-down
Ferris wheel.”).
121. Not everyone is in favor of depending on states more for labor law protection. Id. at
490 (“‘Red’ states like Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, and the like are
forgotten in this equation. Thus, state legislation could repress workers under this
antipreemption scheme and consequently, these ideas are misguided.”).
122. There is actually nothing “simple” about American labor law preemption. See
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 939 (13th ed. 2001) (“Federalstate preemption issues are difficult to resolve in most substantive areas of the law, but they are
particularly complicated in the area of labor-management relations.”).
123. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
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addition, the Commerce Clause124 has been interpreted to give
Congress an almost limitless right to legislate in the labor relations
area.125 Thus, Congress could have chosen to occupy the field of labor
relations law exclusively, but it has never exercised its full powers in
this regard, leaving the states free to pass many state and local laws
and regulations that apply to the workplace.126 The difficult issue that
remains, however, is: What is the preemptive intent of the NLRA
with regard to potentially inconsistent, parallel state labor laws?127
The fact that the NLRA does not have an express preemption
provision only serves to complicate the answer to this question.128
To clarify where the preemption line may lie, it is helpful to
understand that the Supreme Court has set forth two guiding
principles or themes in its labor preemption decisions: (1) the need to
avoid conflicts in substantive rights; and (2) the need to protect the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.129 With regard to guarding against
conflict between state and federal labor law, state laws have been
found preempted under at least four basic circumstances: (1) where
state laws restrict or potentially restricts the exercise of rights under
Section 7 of the NLRA, (2) where state laws permit or potentially
permit conduct that is restricted by the unfair labor practice
provisions of Section 8, (3) where state laws provide a different
remedial scheme than federal labor law, and (4) where state laws seek
to regulate activity that Congress purposefully chose to leave
unregulated.
On the other hand, the complementary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction brings to bear familiar administrative law concepts. Most
importantly, that Congress has created the NLRB to administer and
implement the NLRB and has granted primary jurisdiction to the
124. Id. art. 1, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
125. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984);
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Howell Chevrolet Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 346 U.S. 482 (1953) (upholding application of NLRA to small local retailers of
automobiles).
126. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955) (“By the Taft-Hartley Act,
Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over industrial relations given by the
Commerce Clause.”).
127. When deciding issues of preemption, the purpose of Congress in enacting the NLRA is
the “ultimate touchstone.” Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
128. Even the Court has commented on the obtuseness of the statue: “[The NLRA] leaves
much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.” Garner v.
Teamsters Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953). See also Gottesman, supra note 26, at 374
(“The Court has found nothing on the face of the statute, nor in the legislative history, that
reflects an express decision by Congress one way or the other respecting the survival of state
laws.”).
129. COX ET AL., supra note 122, at 940.
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NLRB, as the court of first resort, to adjudicate disputes that arise
under the statute.130 This means that labor and management must first
use the NLRB to resolve their labor relations disputes. This primary
reliance on the NLRB is, in turn, premised on the NLRB’s expertise
and experience in resolving labor relations matters and on the
importance of fashioning a coherent and uniform body of labor law by
which parties can predicate their future conduct.131
Based on these two guiding principles, the Supreme Court has
developed three preemption doctrines: (1) Section 301 preemption;132
(2) Garmon preemption; and (3) Machinists preemption. Section 301
preemption concerns disputes arising under existing collective
bargaining agreements so does not directly concern the argument
being addressed in this essay, but the other two doctrines are
potentially applicable.
1.

Garmon Preemption Analysis

The Supreme Court held in San Diego Trades Council v.
Garmon133 that the NLRA preempts state laws that Section 7 protects
or arguably protects or that Section 8 prohibits or arguably
prohibits.134 The use of the word “arguably” underscores the breadth
of Garmon preemption.135 Nevertheless, Workplace Freedom Act
legislation would not appear to be subject to Garmon preemption.

130. Id.
131. Jonathan D. Hacker, Note, Are Trojan Horse Union Organizers “Employees”?: A New
Look at Deference to the NLRB’s Interpretation of NLRA Section 2(3), 93 MICH. L.REV. 772,
776 (1995) (observing that courts have consistently recognized the Board’s experience and
expertise with the complexities of industrial relations); Paula K. Knippa, Note, Primary
Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Circumforaneous Litigant, 85 TEX. L.REV. 1289, 1315 (2007) (“The
inconsistent holdings emanating out of both federal and state courts would destroy the
uniformity of the regulatory scheme that Congress hoped to achieve through the administrative
and adjudicatory clearinghouse of the [NLRB].”).
132. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act permits parties to a labor dispute to enforce terms
of a collective bargaining agreement in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 185. “Although section 301
refers only to jurisdiction, it has been interpreted as authorizing federal courts to fashion a body
of common law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.” Antol v. Esposto, 100
F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456
(1957)).
133. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
134. Id. at 245. “Garmon preemption arises when there is an actual or potential conflict
between state regulation and federal labor law due to state regulation of activity that is actually
or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.” See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.
Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
135. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 378 (“Garmon’s ‘arguably protected’ rule imposes greater
restrictions on state courts with respect to labor disputes: so long as the assertion of NLRA
protection is not frivolous, the state court is without authority to proceed, even though ultimately
the NLRB might determine that the challenged conduct is not federally protected.”) (emphasis in
original).
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This is because the state law neither regulates employee activities that
are actually or potentially protected under Section 7, nor does it
permit employer activity that is actually or potentially prohibited
under Section 8. More specifically, Section 7 only provides rights to
employees and says nothing about employer’s rights in the
workplace.136 Section 7 is thus not even arguably implicated.137
Similarly, there is nothing in Section 8 that arguably prohibits the
states from outlawing captive audience speech on labor organizing.
The unfair labor practices discussed therein only apply to employer or
union interference, restraint of or coercion of employee’s Section 7
rights. Even if one were to accept the view of some courts that
Section 8(c) protects “employer rights” under the First Amendment
to express views on unionization in a non-coercive manner to its
employees,138 it does not speak to whether employers may
mandatorily require employees to attend meetings to hear those
views. Section 8(c) is just not applicable to the captive audience
situation, since employers can still freely express their views to
employees who chose to listen during workplace meetings without
having to force their employees to be there.139 In short, workplace

136. Lechmere , Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992) (“By its plain terms, . . . the
NLRA confers rights only on employees.”) (emphasis in original); see also Gottesman, supra
note 26, at 379 (“Section 7 protects only conduct of employees, not of employers. Indeed, the
Act nowhere vests employers with protected rights; on its face, it forbids certain employer
actions, but protects none.”). But see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
137. The en banc Ninth Circuit recently rejected the argument that “to say an activity is not
punishable by the NLRA is to protect that activity.” Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1091.
138. Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We
therefore conclude that section 8(c) does protect employer speech in the unionization campaign
context and can provide a basis for Garmon preemption.”); but see Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1091
(“Notwithstanding the dissent’s mistaken insistence to the contrary, section 8(c) does not grant
employers speech rights. Rather, it simply prohibits their noncoercive speech from being used as
evidence of an unfair labor practice.”) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969)).
139. Indeed, because the employees are coerced into hearing the employer speech, one could
even argue that the exceptions to Section 8(c) for “threats of reprisal or force” come into play
and also make the provision inapplicable to the captive audience meeting context. This appears
to be the argument advanced by the Center for Policy Alternatives when it concludes: “The
Worker Freedom Act addresses only the coercive expression of political and religious views,
something that is entirely within states’ rights to legislate.” See Center for Policy Alternatives,
supra note 86; see also Story, supra note 42, at 405 (“[T]he NLRB and the courts overlook and/or
permit many election statements and interventions by employers which are, in fact, coercive and
which have a tendency, as a result, to chill the exercise of employee rights of self-organization.”).
Story believes that captive audience speech is a paradigmatic example of such unrecognized
coercive interventions. Id. at 422 (“[T]he very exercise of an employer’s legally-sanctioned right
to hold such captive audience meetings, to prevent the union from holding them, to forbid the
asking of questions at such meetings, and to discharge employees who ask ‘loaded questions’ is a
manifestation of coercive power and domination.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Becker,
supra note 42, at 559 (“Although the Board ratified captive audience speeches on account of the
free speech proviso, such conduct involves an element of coercion easily distinguishable from
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captive audience legislation is one of those “activities in labor
relations [that] are neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA and
are therefore not preempted under Garmon.”140
2.

Machinists Preemption Analysis

With Garmon preemption not likely to be an obstacle, this
analysis of the preemption of Worker Freedom Act legislation leads
to another line of preemption cases under Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission.141 Machinists preemption does
provide employers with protection from state law even though
employers do not enjoy express rights under the NLRA.142 In
Machinists, the Court held that the scheme of the NLRA implicitly
left open the availability of economic force to the parties as a way to
resolve labor stalemates.143
Because Congress meant to leave
unregulated economic weapons not expressly protected by Section 7
or prohibited by Section 8,144 state law is preempted when it interferes
with lawful economic pressure applied by either party. Indeed, where
state laws have attempted to give additional economic power to one
side or the other during the collective bargaining process, as some
states have sought to do in the past, such laws have been found to be
preempted under Machinists.145
In many respects, Machinists
preemption has proven to be just as broad as Garmon preemption.146
It is therefore more than just conceivable that the argument
would be advanced that WFA legislation is preempted because an
expression. The captive audience speech is diametrically opposed to the ‘free and open
discussion’ the Board professes to promote.”).
140. Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1091.
141. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
142. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 380 (“The Machinists doctrine depends upon a startling
supposition for those familiar with the climate that spawned the Wagner Act: that Congress
intended, in passing that Act, to ‘protect’ employers from state law disarmament.”).
143. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140; see also N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 495
(1960) (“[T]he use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is . . . part and parcel of
the process of collective bargaining.”).
144. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 144.
145. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 618 (1986)
(finding preempted city law that conditioned employer’s operations on the settlement of a labor
dispute); Employers Ass’n v. United Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding
preempted under Machinists Minnesota law prohibiting permanent replacement of striking or
locked out workers); Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 778 F. Supp. 95,
98 (D. Mass. 1991) (finding preempted Boston ordinance banning permanent replacements that
could pose threat to public safety).
146. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 381 (“The danger inherent in the Machinists doctrine is
that it infers preemption based on rights that the Court discerns although they are nowhere
expressed in the statute.”); Estlund, supra note 10, at 1576 (“Machinists preemption essentially
transforms management’s economic power, and some of its rights under the state law of property
and contract, into federal statutory rights.”).
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employer has the right, consistent with the “free play of economic
forces” under the NLRA,147 to hold workplace captive audience
meetings during union organizational campaigns. Opponents of the
WFA would suggest that allowing such meetings is a well-established,
lawful form of economic pressure that an employer may use to defeat
a union’s campaign.148 Moreover, one might further argue that the
Peerless Plywood rule, which disallows captive audience speeches by
either side twenty-four hours before an election,149 indicates that the
Board has chosen to regulate this area only to that extent and has
decided purposefully not to regulate in this area any further. State
laws that would prohibit such labor-oriented captive audience
meetings would therefore inappropriately place the state’s thumb on
the union side of the scale and regulate an area of the law that the
NLRA meant to keep unregulated. As such, the argument continues,
such state laws should be preempted under Machinists preemption.150
There are, however, at least four potential counter-arguments,
three of which lead to the conclusion that WFA legislation should not
be found preempted under Machinists.
Under the first, less
persuasive of these, at least one court has concluded that Machinists
preemption doctrine has only been applied in the context of collective
bargaining and not in the context of organizing.151 The argument is
that the economic weaponry appropriate for the bargaining context is
inapt for the election process where there is a lack of equality between
unions and employers and not a true “marketplace of ideas.”152
147. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144
(1971)).
148. This exact argument was raised in the slightly different context of state financial
accountability laws. See Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir.
2006) (“The associations also raise an additional Machinists argument; they contend that the
NLRA allows employers free speech as a ‘weapon’ to respond to union organizing campaigns
and to deprive employers of this ‘weapon’ would alter the balance of power created by
Congress.”). Although not dispositive in this analysis, because different federal and state
interests were at play, the Second Circuit in Pataki did not buy the employer’s argument. Id.
149. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
150. Professor Estlund appears to be of the view that, under current labor preemption law,
this broad view of Machinists preemption would likely carry the day. Estlund, supra note 10, at
1579.
151. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (“Machinists doctrine is not likely to apply to organizing, a conclusion that the Chamber of
Commerce conceded during oral argument when it acknowledged that interference with
organizing is ‘typically’ analyzed under the Garmon doctrine.”); see also Estlund, supra note 10,
at 1578 (arguing that the concept of free play of economic forces under Machinists is out of place
in the unorganized workplace where there is not a fair contest or battle).
152. See Becker, supra note 42, at 497 (arguing that current conception of union elections
“rests on a fiction of equality between unions and employers as candidates vying in the electoral
arena.”); Story, supra note 42, at 388 (“[I]t becomes conceptually difficult to consider the
workplace as ‘a marketplace.’ Instead, it is an all-but-monopolized private forum subject to
strictly defined and limited incursions by nonowners, providing constitutionally-protected free
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However, looking at the Machinist opinion itself, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, cites to an article by Archibald Cox for the
proposition that Congress intended some conduct to remain
unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces.153 In the cited
article, Cox did not distinguish between collective bargaining and
organizing, when he stated that, “Congress struck a balance of
protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union
organization, collective bargaining, and labor disputes that would be
upset if a state could enforce statutes or rules of decisions resting
upon its views concerning accommodation of the same interests.”154
This conclusion is further bolstered by language in Metropolitan
Edison Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts: “[Machinist cases] rely on the
understanding that in providing in the NLRA a framework for selforganization and collective bargaining, Congress determined both
how much the conduct of unions and employers should be regulated,
and how much it should be left unregulated.”155 It thus seems
implausible, at least as a doctrinal matter, that Machinists was just a
case that was supposed to apply in the collective bargaining context.
Nevertheless, even if Machinists preemption were found to apply
to the organizational context, there are at least three other persuasive
arguments that help to explain why Machinists preemption would not
preempt WFA legislation. First, responding to the argument that the
Peerless Plywood rule lends support to the argument that the Board
has already regulated captive audience meetings to the extent it
thought necessary and purposely did not regulate any further, it is
important to remember that, “Machinists applies solely to zones of
activity left free from all regulation.”156 The extensive regulation of
organizing activities by the NLRB through its General Shoe
laboratory conditions doctrine157 demonstrates that “organizing-and
employer speech in the context of organizing-is not such a zone.”158
“‘A state law that both explicitly targets and directly regulates
processes controlled by the NLRA’ might be preempted under

speech to one side and not the other, and allowing speech to be delivered to an unwilling
audience.”).
153. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 n.4.
154. Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L.REV. 1337, 1352 (1972).
155. 471 U.S. 724, 751 (1985) (emphasis added).
156. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (emphasis in original) (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v.
Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993) (“Boston Harbor
“)).
157. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
158. Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1089 (emphasis in original) (citing Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B.
545, 547-48 (1957); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953)).
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Garmon . . ., but is surely not preempted ‘under the Machinists
doctrine.’”159
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this
form of preemption where the states “traditionally have had great
latitude under their police powers to legislate as ‘to the protection of
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.’”160 In such
circumstances, “[w]hen a state law establishes a minimal employment
standard not inconsistent with the general legislative goals of the
NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of the Act.”161 Thus,
mandated benefit laws, child labor laws, occupational safety and
health laws, and minimum wage laws, have all survived NLRA
preemption.162
Similarly, states should be able to protect workers from being
harassed and intimidated by employers at work through captive
audience meetings as a minimal working condition.
Or put
differently, states should be able to enact laws that prohibit employers
from firing workers who refuse to attend captive audience meetings
about the employer’s anti-union views.163 Such a state law would
satisfy the conditions of such “minimum condition” laws by not
“prevent[ing] the accomplishment of the purposes of the federal
act.”164 Under such laws, employers would still able to communicate
their views about unionization with their employees as Section 8(c)
contemplates, but just not be able to force them to listen to such
speeches at pains of losing their jobs. Thus, there would be no general

159. Id. at 1089 n.11 (internal citations omitted).
160. Metropolitan Edison, 471 U.S. at 756 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62
(1873)).
161. Id. at 757; see also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971)
(“[The Court] cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any
way the complex interrelationship between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much
of this is left to the States.”). The Court has used similar language in cases under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188: “We hold that the enactment by Congress of the Railway
Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves and did
not preclude the State . . . from making the order in question.” Terminal Ass’n v. Trainmen, 318
U.S. 1, 7 (1943).
162. Metropolitan Edison, 471 U.S. at 756.
163. Accord Gottesman, supra note 26, at 396 (“The states are free to forbid discharges for
any number of reasons, such as refusal of sexual advances, whistle-blowing, refusing to violate
the law, and filing workers’ compensation claims.”); see also Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the
“Representation Gap,” 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 411 (2001) (“The states are free to impose
‘minimum terms of employment’ and extend these to unionized, as well as non-unionized,
employees.”).
164. Metropolitan Edison, 471 U.S. at 756 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 n.20
(1941); Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749-751
(1942); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. [497,] 504 [1978]).
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legislative goal of the NLRA compromised by permitted WFA
legislation to survive preemption.165
Finally, not only should WFA legislation be able to survive
Machinists preemption under a minimum conditions theory, but also
based on the powers of the state to regulate property interests. This
exception to preemption law derives directly from the Court’s holding
in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB.166 More recently, the Court explained
Lechmere and its holding on the relationship between federal labor
law and state property regulation this way:
Without addressing the merits of petitioner’s underlying claim, we
note that petitioner appears to misconstrue Lechmere Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 841, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992). The
right of employers to exclude union organizers from their private
property emanates from state common law, and while this right is
not superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly
protects it. To the contrary, this Court consistently has maintained
that the NLRA may entitle union employees to obtain access to an
employer’s property under limited circumstances. See id., at 537,
112 S.Ct., at 848; N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,
112, 76 S.Ct. 679, 684, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956).167

Two important points can be derived from this passage: (1) private
property rights that emanate from state common law are not
preempted by the NLRA; and (2) these same private property rights
are also not protected by the NLRA. The second point makes clear
that Garmon preemption is not implicated in these property rights
situations or, put differently, situations where employers seek to use
their property as they wish. But even more importantly, the first point
makes clear that no form of labor preemption, Garmon or Machinists,
comes into play when states decide to modify the common law of
property through statute.168
165. See Finkin, supra note 163, at 411 (“[T]he states are free to reach those substantive
aspects of the employment relationship that are not reached, or reached only partially by the
NLRA.”). There is a counter-argument that such a minimum-conditions law should be
preempted because the Board has expressly concluded that employers are allowed to require
employees to attend captive audience meetings. See Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578
(1948). Nevertheless, captive audience meetings generally are neither arguably protected nor
prohibited by the Act, as discussed above, and the NLRA’s policy of employee free choice runs
counter to permitting employers to force employees to attend these meeting. See Story, supra
note 42, at 422 (“[T]he very exercise of an employer’s legally-sanctioned right to hold such
captive audience meetings, to prevent the union from holding them, to forbid the asking of
questions at such meetings, and to discharge employees who ask ‘loaded questions’ is a
manifestation of coercive power and domination.”).
166. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
167. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994) (emphasis added).
168. Accord Waremart Foods, 337 N.L.R.B. 389 (2001) (“The Respondent asserts that the
ability to exclude non-union representatives from its property is the kind of economic weapon
that Congress intended to be available to employers and thus is not subject to regulation by the
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The Court applied this very same principle to the advantage of
employers in Lechmere where it found that non-employee union
organizers generally had no right to access employer property to
solicit for union membership.169 The right to exclude these organizers
did not derive from federal labor law, but rather the property rights of
the employers.170 And just as a state may permit employers to exclude
non-employee organizers as part of the employer’s property rights,
just as surely states can seek to limit those same property rights and
refuse to allow employers to harass or intimidate their employees
during mandatory meetings discussing the employer’s anti-union
views.171 It is just a matter of states, by statutes, modifying the bundle
of property rights that employers enjoy under state law.172 Lechmere
and its progeny stand for nothing less than the proposition that the
NLRA does not supersede the ability of states to regulate common
law rights of property and therefore WFA legislation is within the
state’s power to undertake if they choose to do so.173
In short, both the minimum conditions and property rights
exceptions to Machinist preemption would seem to permit state
enactments of WFA legislation to avoid NLRA preemption.

States. Accordingly, the Respondent contends that the State’s attempt to deprive it of that right
is preempted under Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132
(1976). We reject that contention.”), vacated on other grounds, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
169. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537.
170. See Glendale Assocs., Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]his
Court, along with other Circuits and the Board, have found Lechmere to be inapplicable to cases
where an employer excluded nonemployee union representatives in the absence of a state
property right to do so.”); see also id. at 1152 (“An employer’s state property right controls
where an employer may ban nonemployee union representatives because ‘state property law is
what creates the interest entitling employers to exclude organizers in the first instance. Where
state law does not create such an interest, access may not be restricted consistent with Section
8(a)(1) [of the NLRA].”) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999)).
171. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (“Appellants’ claim in this case amounts to no less than a suggestion that the
common law of trespass is not subject to revision by the State, notwithstanding the California
Supreme Court’s finding that state-created rights of expressive activity would be severely
hindered if shopping centers were closed to expressive activities by members of the public. If
accepted, that claim would represent a return to the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25
S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905), when common-law rights were also found immune from revision
by State or Federal Government.”).
172. See Gottesman, supra note 26, at 412 (“While there is a zone of federal prohibition,
there is no zone of federal protection of an employer’s right to exclude. If states wish to go
further in restricting the employer’s property rights, no federal interest is implicated.”).
173. For a thoughtful argument that unions’ rights of access to employer property should not
even depend on state property law, but on whether exclusion chills employees’ Section 7 rights,
see Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L.REV.
891, 892-93 (2006) (“[T]he Board no longer would consider state property rights. Instead, it
would presume that an employer’s peaceful request to stop organizing activity on what appears
to be its property is lawful, and presume that any action going beyond such a request violates the
NLRA.”).
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IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING AMERICAN LABOR PREEMPTION LAW
FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM
Although this essay argues that under current labor preemption
doctrine, Worker Freedom Act legislation should survive labor law
preemption, the answer is not nearly as clear cut as it should be. And
in an environment where there exist an increasing number of judges
with pro-employer, conservative judicial philosophies,174 it would not
be far-fetched to predict that a number of courts would still apply
these same labor preemption principles under the Machinists line of
cases to strike down WFA legislation. Indeed, this outcome may be
more likely based solely on this generation of federal court judges’
lack of familiarity with labor law cases because of their relative rarity
in the federal courts these days.175
In any event, to protect employees from the evils of workplace
captive audience meetings, this section seeks to provide a more sound
doctrinal basis for finding WFA legislation not preempted by federal
labor law. In making this argument, this essay relies heavily on the
persuasive analysis put forth by Professor Michael Gottesman in his
piece concerning how labor preemption doctrine should be reinterpreted consistent with the purposes of federal labor law and
principles of federalism.
In the article, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws
Facilitating Unionization,176 Gottesman argues that the current
approach to labor law preemption under Garmon and Machinist
preemption is overbroad.177 Instead, he points to a significant
distinction, overlooked by courts, between different types of labororiented conduct that states seek to regulate. Specifically, some
conduct, like picketing, lies on a protected-prohibited continuum that
Congress has chosen to regulate in its entirety.178 “[C]onduct on a
continuum is conduct that the NLRA protects up to a point and

174. James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward
Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1675, 1715-19 (1999) (correlating union support in labor cases with a judges being appointed
by a Democratic president); Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The
Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L.
247, 265 (2005) (“Due to the conservative appellate appointments by President George W. Bush,
the federal judiciary is presumably more conservative today than in 2000.”).
175. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and
the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 426- 27 (1995).
176. Gottesman, supra note 26.
177. Id. at 355 (“My thesis is that, contrary to prevailing wisdom, the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) does not wholly preempt the states’ ability to adopt laws facilitating
unionization and enhancing employee leverage in collective bargaining with employers.”).
178. Id. at 357.
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prohibits beyond that point.”179 Either picketing is protected as
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection under Section 7
(because it enhances bargaining power) or it is prohibited conduct
under Section 8 (like secondary picketing180 because of its impact on
the business of neutral employers).181 But all in all, Congress has
chosen to completely occupy the field of employee picketing rights
under federal labor law and it is for the NLRB, not the states, to
decide where the line exists on this picketing continuum between
protected and prohibited conduct.182 It is important that the NLRB
make this determination between protected and prohibited picketing
in a consistent, uniform matter so future exercise of these rights will
not be chilled.183 So with picketing, the broad Garmon preemption
doctrine, which seeks to avoid substantive conflicts in situations where
conduct is even arguably protected or prohibited, makes much more
sense.
On the other hand, there is conduct, like a union seeking an equal
opportunity to address employees on employer property that does not
lay on a continuum that Congress has chosen to regulate completely.184
“Conduct not on a continuum is prohibited in some of its
manifestations, but federal law does not protect it otherwise.”185 In
these situations, Gottesman argues that states should be free to
regulate beyond the point that the federal labor law, and
corresponding federal interest, no longer come into play.186 In this
vein, he states that, “[i]n choosing a standard, states may consciously
attempt to affect the relative interests of employers, unions and
employees regarding unionization and collective bargaining.”187

179. Id. at 395.
180. Section 8(b)(4) prevents most forms of secondary picketing by unions because it causes
neutral employers to become embroiled in labor disputes not of their own making. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); Estlund, supra note 10, at 1607 (“[T]he [NLRA]’s ban on secondary boycotts
constrains the means by which unions can put pressure on legally ‘neutral’ employers . . . . “);
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L.REV. 1018, 1032 (1998) (“[T]he secondary boycott
provisions try to prevent unions from dragging neutral employers into the fray.”).
181. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 357.
182. Id. (“Congress had created an expert agency, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), to identify the fine line that distinguishes protected from prohibited conduct. To allow
state regulation would create an intolerable risk to federal interests; state courts might err in
locating the line and award damages for conduct the N.L.R.B. would deem protected by the
NLRA.”).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 358.
185. Id. at 395.
186. Id. at 359.
187. Id. at 360.
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For instance, Congress and the courts have interpreted the
NLRA to permit union access to employer property to address
employees during organizational campaigns only when the union is
completely unable to communicate with employees through other
alternative means or where the employer discriminatorily restricts
access to property.188 Beyond this extremely limited right to access
employer property, federal labor law is silent on the ability of the
employer to exclude union organizers from their property.189 And
indeed, Lechmere, decided after the Gottesman article, stands for the
proposition that an employer’s property interest almost always
outweighs the competing derivative rights of non-employee, union
organizers under Section 7 of the NLRA.190 But it does not stand to
reason, therefore, that the NLRA somehow “confer[s] upon
employers a right they had not theretofore possessed: to be free of
state dedication of private property for union organizing wherever
federal law did not create a right of union access.”191
Nor should the continuing validity of the Machinists preemption
doctrine impact this modified labor preemption doctrine.
As
Gottesman argues, it is unlikely that, “Congress provided access only
in exceptional circumstances because it thought that unions and
employees ought not to communicate too freely or that employers
should be protected against any broader intrusion on their
premises.”192 It is much more likely that “Congress provided limited
access merely because it did not think the federal interest in unionemployee communication warranted any greater intrusion on the
state’s sovereign prerogative to define property interests.”193 In other
words, because limited access rights to union organizers show respect
for state regulation over property interests, states should be able to
adjust those property interests as they see fit without running afoul of
NLRA preemption.
Indeed, this conclusion is consistent with what the Supreme
Court later stated in Thunder Basin Coal Co.: “The right of

188. Lechmere Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). As discussed in Part I, this is an extremely narrow exception that
is limited to such situations as lumber camps and remote resorts. See supra notes 66, 72 and
accompanying text.
189. Another way of viewing this Congressional silence on the issue is that the federal
interest to insure union access to employer property to foster organizational rights does not
extend to those situations where unions have other viable means for contacting employees it
seeks to organize. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 358.
190. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 533.
191. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 358.
192. Id. at 416-17
193. Id. at 417.
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employers to exclude union organizers from their private property
emanates from state common law, and while this right is not
superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects
it.”194 Unlike the picketing example, there is no other side of the
continuum where access to employer property is prohibited under
Section 8. This is simply not an area where Congress chose to
completely preempt the field and the NLRA “did not otherwise
intend to disturb the states’ existing authority to define property
interests.”195
Similarly, workplace captive audience speech is also conduct of
the non-continuum variety that states should be free to regulate as
property interests beyond a certain point without fear of Garmon or
Machinists preemption. Indeed, state regulation in the workplace
captive audience meeting context could actually occur in one of two
ways. First, state laws could require that unions be given equal access
to employer property for pro-union captive audience speeches when
employers give their own captive audience speeches. Like Lechmere
and Babcock, NuTone & Avondale stands for the proposition that
unions do not have the right to address employees on employer
property unless it is shown that the union has completely no other
alternative way to communicate with prospective union members.196
Beyond that point, however, state property law takes over and
generally permits employers to exclude unions from holding captive
audience meetings. But again, the point is that unions are excluded as
a matter of state property law, not federal labor law. Nothing in the
NLRA protects employers in their ability to exclude the union from
the workplace.197 Consequently, a state law modifying property rights
should not be preempted by the NLRA.198
The Worker Freedom Act legislation that out-and-out prohibits
employer captive audience speech on labor-oriented topics would be
just another way for states to modify existing property interests in a

194. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994) (emphasis added).
195. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 358. Gottesman aptly observes in this regard: “In [these
non-continuum cases], the federal interest is in protecting employees’ rights of self-organization:
there is no countervailing federal right for employers. Any such employer rights are derived
from state law, and the choice whether to constrict them thus should lie with the states.” Id. at
411.
196. N.L.R.B. v. Steelworkers (NuTone & Avondale), 357 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1958).
197. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 417 (“Congress did not confer upon employers a federal
right to fence out organizers.”).
198. One Ninth Circuit case has actually cited Professor Gottesman’s article and upheld a
state law permitting additional property rights for unions. See N.L.R.B. v. Calkins, 187 F.3d
1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding California law permitting labor picketing on private property
not preempted by the NLRA).
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way that facilitates unionization. In this context, Section 8(c) requires
the minimum condition of allowing employers to share their views on
unionization with their employees. To the extent that a state were to
pass a law somehow interfering with all non-coercive speech to
employees prior to twenty-four hours before a union election, that law
would be rightly preempted under Garmon preemption as something
that would be prohibited under Section 8. On the other hand, if the
free speech rights of the employer are secured, and the only thing at
issue is whether employers can force their employees to hear their
views on unionization during work, a part of the continuum has been
reached where federal labor law is silent and there is no longer any
federal interests implicated. Rather, the realm of state property law
has been reached, and consistent with notions of federalism,199 states
should given free reign to modify the bundle of property rights that
employers currently hold and prohibit captive audience meetings
during union organization campaigns.
Now, this way of seeing labor preemption is no doubt a doubleedged sword for those who favor increased unionization in this
country. Just as more progressive states may choose to modify
property rights to permit unions equal access to property and to
prohibit labor-oriented captive audience speech, other states could
manipulate state law to favor employer interests.200 Although state
legislators have the ability to be creative in this manner, it is hard to
imagine how the background norms animating state property, or
contract law for that matter, could be made much more employerfriendly than they already are.201 Employees in the United States exist
in a world where employers have nearly absolute property rights to
exclude unions and others from their workplaces and the
employment-at-will doctrine gives employers maximum flexibility
when it comes to hiring and terminating their employees.202 In short,
the benefits of permitting states to legislate in a way that favors the
ability of unions to organize seems to greatly outweigh any

199. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 361 (“[T]he Warren Court’s pro-preemption preference is
inconsistent with constitutional federalism and separation-of-power norms.”).
200. Gould, supra note 33, at 490 (““Red” states like Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Alabama, and the like are forgotten in this equation. Thus, state legislation could
repress workers under this antipreemption scheme and consequently, these ideas are
misguided.”).
201. Accord Estlund, supra note 10, at 1574 (“Employers have the property that is . . .
protected, while organized labor traditionally relies on the power of numbers and of more or less
disruptive concerted activities such as picketing.”).
202. Id. at 1596 (“[Employers] own the workplace, and they effectively own the employees’
jobs under the prevailing American presumption of employment at will.”).
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disadvantage that might come if legislatures seek to pass employerfriendly laws under the same preemption theory advanced above.203
And besides, there’s really nothing to lose given the current state
of American labor law, is there?204
CONCLUSION
Workplace captive audience meetings remain one of the most
effective, and inequitable, tools that employers in the United States
use during union organizational campaigns. Rather than there being
any let up in the use of these meetings, employers are taking
advantage of the unregulated nature of their workplaces to
increasingly also subject their employees to their views on political
and religious matters.
Commendably, and because there exists a federal void in this
area of workplace law, states have taken the legislative initiative to
ban such workplace captive audience meetings. Although this
Workplace Freedom Act legislation has not passed any state
legislature in its unmodified form as of the writing of this essay, recent
successes in the legislative process suggest that there is reason to
believe that such laws will soon be enacted.
With regard to labor-oriented captive audience meetings, this
essay takes the view that WFA legislation should not be preempted by
the NLRA under current labor preemption doctrine. Rather, states
should remain free to regulate the minimum conditions of
employment and the property rights of employers without running
afoul of federal labor relations law.
Nevertheless, there is always the possibility that WFA legislation
could be found preempted under a too-generous interpretation of
Machinists preemption. Consequently, this essay renews the call for
the adoption of a modified labor preemption doctrine in the United

203. Accord id. at 1577 (“A narrower preemption doctrine would thus predictably afford
more room for the regulation of employer conduct than for the regulation of employee and
union conduct.”); Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations
Law?, 58 LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS’N SERIES 125 (2006), available at
http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/irra/proceedings2006/freeman.html (last visited June 8,
2007) (“Labor would fare better if the United States reduced federal preemption of private
sector labor relations law and devolved the legal regulation and enforcement of freedom of
association and collective bargaining to the states.”).
204. Freeman, supra note 203 (“While there are no guarantees, turning the law regulating
private sector labor relations and/or its enforcement over to the states cannot be much worse
than the U.S. labor law is now. Washington has failed. Why not see if Sacramento and Bismarck,
Albany and Oklahoma City, Des Moines and Detroit, Salt Lake City and Madison can do
better?”).
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States by the U.S. Supreme Court.205 Under this conception,
championed first by Professor Gottesman, states would be free in noncontinuum instances to pass state legislation that increases the chances
for workers to form unions.
The Court is best able to undertake this needed modification
because, in the absence of an express preemption provision in the
NLRA, the Court has been the driving force in promulgating current
labor preemption doctrine. And just as the Court was free to fashion
the current doctrine, it should be equally free to reformulate labor
preemption law to be more consistent with the purposes of NLRA
and with the principles of federalism.

205. Given the political impasse that has stymied labor law reform for the last fifty years, this
essay takes the view that it is unrealistic to expect Congress to change preemption law through a
federal amendment to the NLRA any time soon.

